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1 

IW BEPLT TO 

PATRICK HENRY. 

0BlaI5ALLT rUBLISHBD IK TBE HXTIOSXL UTTELLIOXRCER. 






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TO T2f£ EDITORS. 

Onslow's respects to Messrs. Gales & Sea- 
ton, and again requests th» indulgence of being 
heard through their paper. He encloses two 
numbers in reply to Patrick Henry's last num- 
ber, and he would be gratified with an early in- 
sertion. 

Onslow sensibly feels the prompt attention ofr 
Messrs. Gales & Seaton to his former commu- 
nication. Fairness required that it should have 
appeared in the Journal, through which the at- 
tack was made. He did not anticipate that a 
calm and argumentative defence of the second 
officer of the Government, on a subject so deep- 
ly interesting to the People of the United States 
as every inquiry must be, which touches on so 
vital a point in our system, as the freedom of 
debate, would be excluded from a place in the 
Journal. Yet, so it was ; and he now more deep- 
ly feels the injustice, since Patrick Henry, avail- 
ing himself of that exclusion, has replied ia the 
same paper — not to his arguments in their real 
character, but as unfairly represented by him- 
self. Whether the course in-licates a sincere 
desire to arrive at truth on a subject which has 
excited much interest, or feeling* of a political 
or personal hostility, the American People must 
judge. 



ONSLOW, 

Ijr HEPLT TO 

PATIUCK HENEY. 



No. 1. V— ^ "I H 2 ^ 

IF rumor may be credited, I may be pvoud in having; 
▼ou as an antagonist ; and if I were actuated by a senti- 
ment of vanity, much of my reply would be devoted to 
tracing the strong, but, perhaps, accidental analogy, 
between the style of your numbers and some of our 
public documents. But truth, and not the gratification 
of vanity, is my object ; and thouijh the pride of victo- 
ry would be swelled in proportion to the high standing 
of an opponent, I shall, without stopping to inquire into 
the question of authorship, proceed directly to the point 

at issue. 

If you have failed in your argument, you have at 
least succeeded in giving the question a new and inter- 
esting aspect. You have abandoned the rules and usa- 
ges of the Senate, as the source of the Vice President's 
authority, as the presiding officer of the Senate. You 
contend, that the disputed right is derived directly from 
the Constitution, and that the Vice President's authori- 
ty is wholly independent of the -will of the Senate, 
which can neither give, nor take it away. It is not my 
wish to misstate ynur arguments in the slightest degree, 
and, to avoid the possibility of misrepresentation, you, 
shall speak for yourself. Spurning the authority of the 
Senate, you scornfully observ- : " With tlie eas;. as- 
'' surance of a man stating a conceded postulate, h(Ons- 
" low) says — ' After all, the power of the Vice Presi- 
" dent must depend upon the rules and usages of the 



" ??ena(e* — a pnstulate not only false in its principle, 
" but *hic!i, if Till , wi>ul() not siis'ain the cause to whose 
" aiil it o invoked Unless the Constitution ofthe Unit- 
" eil States was subj-c'ed to some military constmc- 
" tion, the power uf the \'ice President, in pr siding 
"ov.rtlie Senate, rests on deep- r, holir-r f )Und.itinns, 
•• tlia fi y rules or iisaj^-s which that body ma\ adopt. 
"\Vhatsu\s the Constitution? ' The Vice President 
" of the Un t,d States shall be President of the Senate, 
" but shall :iave no vote unless they be equally divided.' 
" • The Sena'e shall choose th ir own offir<-rs, and also 
*• a President pro tempore, in the absence ofthe V'ice 
*' President, or when he shall exercise the office of Pre- 
" sident of the United^tates.'— (Const. U. S. Art 1. 
" Sec- .3.) It is here nrtade the duty of the Vice Fre- 
" sident to preside over the Senate, under the sole re- 
" striciion of having no vote, exce[)t in a given case 
" the right of the Senate to choose their I'rtsident 
" is confined to two contingencies ; his powers, uiter 
"beii.gso chosen, are identiral witti those of the Pre- 
"sident set over theno by the Constitution, and any 
*' abritlgment of those powers by the Senate would 
"be a palpable infraction of that Constitution. Now 
" Sir, w hat is the imp Tt of the term • to preside,* 
*' in relation to a deliberative assembly ? Can any 
" sophistry devise a plausible definition of it, whiclj 
" wou d exclude the power of preserving order ? In 
" appointing an officer to preside over the Senate, the 
" People surely intended, not to erect an empty pageant, 
" but to accomplish some useiul object : and when, in 
" another part of the Constitution, they authorize each 
" House ' to determine the rules of its proceedings,' 
" they do not authorize it to adopt rules depriving tny of- 
*' fice created by the Constitution, of powers belonging, 
" ex vi (ermiui, to that office. If the plainest,or most pro- 
" found man in the community were nsked what powers 
"lie supposed to be inherent in the presiding officer of 
«' either Hoi;-,e of Congress, he would instantly enume- 
" rate, first, the power of preserving order in its deli- 
" beralions ; next, that of collecting the sense of its 
" members on any question submitted to their decision; 
" and thirdly, that of authenticating, by his signature, 
" their leg sbtive acts. 1 have before said, and I regret 
" that 1 ani obliged to repeat a truism, that ' the right 
•' to call to order is a necessary consequence ofthe povv- 
" erof preserving order;' aiul that 'unless a deliberative 
" body, acting within the sphere of its competence, 
" expressly restrict this power and this right, no restric- 
"tior. on them can then be supposed.' Ir. divesting the 



5 

" President set over them by the People, of any powef 
'• which lie had received, either expressly or impliedly, 
•• from the People, the Senate, i isiead ot ' acting with- 
" in the sphere of their competence,' would act usurp- 
" in.Gfly, and unconstitutionally — they would nullify the 
" connexion which the People had established between 
♦* themselves and their President ; th y would reduce 
" themseves to the monstrous spectacle of a body with- 
" out a head,and their I'resid-.'nt to the equally monstrous 
•• spectacle of ahead without a body ; and tiieir violent 
•' act, while it would be disobeyed as illegal, would be 
" contemned as ridiculous. But, in truth, the Senate 
" have never thus forgotten their allegiance to the Con- 
♦' stitution." 

There can be no mistake as to the source, or the na- 
ture of the power, according to your conception. You 
tell HS plainly, that it rests " on a deeper, holier foun- 
dation" than the ndesofthe Senate— that it is -'inhe- 
rent in the Vice President, and that, as presiding offi- 
cer, he possesses it e.r vi termini ; thai an attempt to di- 
vest, and, of course to modily the power, ' by the Se- 
nate, would be to act' usurpingly, and unconstitution- 
all\ ," and that " such violent ad would be disobeyed as 
illegal, and contemned as ridiculous." 

These are, at least, lofty grounds, and, if they can be 
maintained, t)ere is an end of the cimtroversy. It 
would be absurd to go further. An incpiiry into the 
rules and usages of the Senate, after sucli grounds are 
occupied, becomes ridiculous, and much more so, an 
inquiry into those of the Houses of Parliiiment : tor 
surely if it is beyond the power of the Senate to give op 
withhold the right, it must stand on an elevition far 
above parliamentary rules or usages ; and I was there- 
Tore not a littl surprized to find, tlia , after so bold an 
assertion, more than four fifths of your long and elabo* 
rate essay was devoted to a learned and critical inquiry 
into tlie e very rules and usages. There can be but 
one explanation of so strange an inconsis!cn:y ; but 
that a very satisfactory one. You lack confidence in 
your own position ; and well might y u : for, sur-l), 
power So despo'ic and dang rous, so inconsistent with 
the first principles of liberty, aad every sound view of 
the Constitution, was never attempted to be es- 
tablished on argunien's so imbecile and absurd ; 
to which no intellect, however badly organized, 
could yield assent, unless associated with fei lings 
leaning strongly to the side of power. That such 
are your feeling's, no one who reads your essay c^n 
"Joubt. None of your sympathies are on the demoecat."' 



jc side of our institutions. If a question can be made 
asto where power is lo'li^-ed, itreijuires but little saga- 
city to perceive, that you will be found on the side 
which will place it in the fewest and least responsible 
liands. You perceive perfection only in the political 
arrangenfient, which, with simplicity and energy, gives 
power to a single will. It is not, then, at all siirprizing, 
that you should seize on that portion of tlie Coiistitu- 
tion which appoints the Vice President to be Fresidt-nt 
of the Senate ; and timtyou should quote it at large, and 
dwell on it at length, as the source of high and unconlroU 
able power in that officer; while you have but slightly and 
casually adverted to another section in the same article, 
which clothes theSenate with the power 'of determining 
the rules of their proccedings.punishing its members for 
disorderly conduct, and with the concurrence of two 
thirds, of expelling a member." — (See Art. 1. Sec. 5.) 
Had your predilections for the unity and irresponsibility 
of power been less strong, you could not have failed to 
see, that the point of view in vvhicli you have thought 
proper to place the question, made it one of relative 
power between the Senate and its presiding officer. 
You place the Vice President on one side, and tlie 
Senate on the other ; and the more you augment the 
constitutional power ot the former, as the presiding offi- 
cer, just in the same proportion, you diminish tlie pow- 
er of the latter. What is gained to the one, is lost to 
the other ; and, in this competition of power, >oa 
were hound to present tiill^ and fairly, both tides. This 
}ou have not do'ie, and consequentl), you have fallen, 
rot only into gro^s bm dangerous errors. You set out 
by asserting thut the very object of the appointment of 
the ^■ice President as Presidcn of the Senate was, to 
preserve order, and that he has all the powers ex vi 
termini, (>ect;ss;ir> to the attainment of ih- end fur wlncli 
he was appointed. Having gained this point, you make 
your next step, that the right of e forcmg order in- 
volves that of calling to order, and that again involves 
ihevery power in ques ion, which the Vice President 
declined to exercPbC You then ilraw two corrollane* ; 
ihhi the power h Id by the Vice President being der'V- 
ed direct from the (Jon titut on, s held indepe' dendy 
of the Senate, and is, consequeitly, beyond thiir on- 
trol or pariicij.alion ; and that, as the Vice President 
alone pjissesses it, he, and he alone, is responsible for 
order and decorum. Such isy"ur ■iimm..ry h gic, w ;ch 
y-'ii accompany with so much abuse of Mr. Calhoun, 
for not ciiliiiig the p; wt , which you h.-ve, as _\o'i sup- 
poic, cltaily proven that he possesses by the Uonstitu 



J* 
i 



tion, into active cncrpy, by correcting; and controlling, 
at his s()lf will and jileasiire, tlie licentious and imperti- 
nent debates of the Senators. 

Let us now turn the same mode of reasoning on the 
side of the Senate, and you will perceive thot it :ipplies, 
with intimte more force, thouj^h you have nut thought 
it deservinfj of notice. 

The Con^titnt.on has vested the Senate with the rigfht 
of dttermininfj the rules of it^i proceedings, and of 
punishing members for disorderly conduct, which may 
extf nd even to expulsion. l he great object of giving 
the power to establish rules, is to preserve order. The 
onU edectual means of preserving order is to prescribe 
bv rule-;, what shall be a violation of order, and to en- 
force the same by adequate punisnment. The "Senate 
alone has these powers b> the Const tutiun ; consequent- 
ly, the Senate alone has tlie right of enforcing order; 
and. consequently, whatevtr right tlie Vice President 
possesses over order, must be derived from the Senate; 
and, Iheret re, he can exercise no power in adopting 
rules or enforcing them, but what has been delegated 
to him by the Senate, and only to the extent, both in 
manner and mutter, to which tne power has been dele- 
gated. The particular power in quettion not having 
been delegated, cannot be exercised b} the Vice Pre- 
sident, and, consequenily, he is not responsible. l>o 
you not perceive the irresistible force with which your 
own mode of reasoning applies to the substantial consti- 
tutional powers of the Senate, and how partial and ab- 
surd your arguments in favor of tlie infiretl constitu- 
tional power of its presiding ofhctr must a|)p. ar in con- 
trast witli it P As absurd as it now ap|>ears, it shall be, 
if possible, infinitely more so, before 1 have closed this 
part ot the invest gat on. 

W.th the same picddection, your assumptions are all 
on the side ot uncontrolled and unlimit -d power. With- 
out |>r. of, or r ven an attempt at it, jou assume, that tlie 
power in contr^versv is inlitrent in the Vice President, 
and that he possesses it, ex vi termini, as presiding offi- 
cer of the Senate. Now I, who have certainly as .nuch 
rifihl t« assume as yourself, deny that he possesses any 
such pi.wer, and, wl.at maj perhaps startle a mmd organ- 
ized hk } urs, 1 atlirni that, as a presiding ■ fficer, he 
has no inheient [ji w r whatever, unless th t of doing 
wh.ttlie Senate ma) pre>cribe by its rules, be such a 
powei. Th re aie, indeed, inhertnt powers, but ihey 
are in the bodt/, and n(.t in the officei: He is a mere 
.igent to execute tne wid ct the loi uier. He can exer- 
cise no power wliicU be does not bold by delegation, 



either express or implied. He stands in the same re- 
lati n to tlifr bi)ily, or asst-mbly o\er which lie presides» 
til ta mag'istrute in a i<v public does t) tne State, and 
it would be as absurd to attribute to the latter inherent 
powers as to the t'otmer. This, in fact, was once a fash- 
ionable doctrine. There was a time when mii>ii>iis of 
power thought ii monstrous, that all of the powtrs of 
ru'ers should bf derived from so low and tilth) a source 
as the Ptopk winim thej gowrn. "A deeper and 
holier foundation ' of power was sought, and that was 
prorlainied to be in the "inherent" divine "right of 
rulers ;" and, as their powers were thus shown to be 
independent of the will of the Pei.ple, it followed, that 
any attempt on ihpir part 'o divest rulers of power, 
would be an act of ''such violence as would be disobey- 
ed as illegal and contemned as ridiculous." I might 
trace the analogy between jour language and principles 
and those of the advocate of despotic power in all ages 
and countries much ttirther, but I deem it not necessary 
either to weaken or refute your arguments. A more 
direct a d decisive reply may be gi\en. 

An inherent power is one that belongs essentially to the 
office, and is in its ratu e inseparable from it. To divest 
the office of it would be to change its nature. It would be 
no longer the same office. It is, then, a power wholly in- 
dependent of the circumstances how the office may be 
created or Hlled. or in what particidar manner its func- 
tions may he exercised, if, then, the power belongs to 
the Vice President inher ntl\, as pr* siding officer ol the 
Senat-, it is because it is essentially attached to the mere 
function of presiding in a deliberative assembl>, and 
oonsequently belongs to all presiding officer) over such 
assemblies : for it would be absurd to assert that it i^ in- 
herent in hiti) as I resident of the Senate, a d then make 
it depend on the circumstance, that he holds his ap- 
pointment to preside i th. Senate by the Cffis:itjitioTi. 
The high power, then, which you attribute to the Vice 
Presde t, muit belong, if your argument be correct, to 
the Speaker of the House of Commons, to the L rd 
Ch.ancellor, as presiding officer of the House of Lords, 
*o the Sjieaker of the House of Ui presentativ s, and 
those of our State Lcgibh.tures. They must not o- ly 
possess the power, but n.ust h hi it independently of the 
will ot the bodies over wldch they preside; which can 
neither give nor take it away, nor modify the mode ot 
exercising it, nor control its operation. These conse- 
quences, absurd ;is they appear to be, are legitimately 
drawn fr m yonr premi.si s 

Now, " out 01 tume own raoiitb I will condemn thee;" 



by your own aiithnrities ri'i shall be refuted. To prove 
that the \'ice President pis^ess-^s th.s piiwf r, you have 
labored to estab'iih the fact that the Sprak- r of the 
House ot Commons holi's and exercisps U, and in proof 
of which you have tittd many cases from JeH'ersoii's 
Manual. 

It IS true that he has, at least to a certain extent; but 
bow has he uc(iu red it ? This i> the important inquiry 
in the point of view in which we are now co-'uideriig 
the ques'ion. Is it inherent, or is it deltgated ? If the 
former, I acknowledge that yourarpiimcnt.from analogy, 
in favor i«f tile inherent pov r of the ir e Hresid nt,w uld 
ha»e muc > forct; bu ,if the latter, it must utterly f^ii: tor, 
if delegated,)! clearly establishes the fact, that llie power 
is :n the bo'ly, a d not in x^e presidinff officer,- a^td, conse- 
quently, nat inherent in tlie Vice President, as you af- 
firm. The instances that you huve cited shall decide 
the point. What say 'he casrs? "On the 14th of 
*• April, 1604, rule conceived, ''Tiiat, if any man speuk 
" impertinently, or beside the question in hind, it 
•* stands with the orders c^f the Hou-ie for the Speaker 
"to interrupt him; and to show tlie pleasure of the 
''House, whether they will further hear Inm." "On 
" the I7th of April, 1604, agreed for a general rule, if 
" any superfluous motion or tedious speech be offered 
" in the House, the party is to be directed and ordered 
"by Mr. S, eaker." "On the 19th of May, 1604, Sir 
*' Wdliam Paddy entering in'n a long speech, a rvle 
*' agreed, that if any man speak n.'t 'o the ma ter in 
" question, the Speaker is to moderate. So it is said 
" on t le 2'J of Mny, 1610, when a mem'ier made what 
" seemed a'l impertinent '^peech, and there was much 
*' hissing and spitting," " that it was conceived for a rule, 
"that Mr. Speaker may stay impertinent bpeech-s." — 
*' O I the 10th of November, 1640, it was declared, that 
♦• when a bus ness is begun and in debate, if any man 
*' rise to speak to a new business, any member may, 
" oMt Mr Speaker ough^ to, interrupt him." See Hat- 
sell's Precedents, vol. 2 I, 3d edition. 

Uo you not notice, thai in every cas ', the power was 
delega'ed by the House ; that the language is, " rule 
conceived," "it was agreed to as general rule," " rule 
agre d," &c., &c., and this too in relation to the verj, 
power in question, according to your oivn she~ving ? Thus 
it is esablished, beyond controversy, that, in the House 
of Commons, the piweris really in the body, and not in 
tbe pr -siding ofRcer. 

It, to this decided proof that the power has been dele- 
gated to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and 



10 

is, consequently, not Inherent, we add- that it is confer- 
red on tiie Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
(see I'Jth rule,) by an express rule of the House, and 
that the Lord Chancellor, as presiding officer in the 
House of Lords, possesses it not i it u r ex officio or by 
dele^Tition, as slmll be shown hereafter, your monstrous 
and slavish doctrine that it is an inherent power, will be 
complttely overthrown, and you are Icit without the 
possibility of escape. 

Should you iitenipt t' extricate yourself, by endea- 
voring to sho*, that, under our Constitution, the rela- 
%\\e powers of the Vice President and the Senate are 
diflerent frona those of t'le Speaker and the House of 
Commons ; and t lat, though the latter nr.ay ho d the 
power by delegation from the body, th-it the V ce Pre- 
side nt may possess it by a different and higher ten .re ; 
it would, at least, prove ttiat you cede the point that it is 
not inhereiit, and also that it cannot be deduced from an- 
alogy between the p^ivers of tlie two presiding offioer.e, 
which )'ou have so mucli relied on in another pait of 
your essay. But this shall not avail you. The door is 
already closed in that direction. It has been, I trust, 
conclusively proved, tliat the Constitution, so f.-r from 
countenancing the idea of the power being inherent In 
fhe Vice President, gives it t ) tlie Senate, by the stroi'g- 
est implication, in conferring the express right of estab- 
lishing its own rules, and punishing for disorderly con- 
duct. If you are not yet convinced, additional argu- 
ments are not wanting, which, though they may not 
extoit an acknowledgment of your error, will thorough- 
ly convince you of it. 

You have overlooked the most obvious and best estab- 
lished rules of construe tion What are the facts ? The 
Const. t'ltion has designated the Vice President as Presi- 
dent of the Senate, and has also clotaed that body with 
the right of determining tlie rules of its proceedings. 
It is cbvious that the simple int nf.on of the framers of 
that instrument was to annex to the office of Vice Presi- 
dent th:it of President of the Senate, without intending 
to d fine the extent or the limit of his power in that 
characi r, an>l in like manner it was the intention to 
confer on the Senatt simply the pow-r of enacting its 
own lules of proceeding, wlttiout reference t i the pow- 
ers, such as they may be, that had been conferred on 
tlieir presiding officer. I he exte. t of pow< r, as betwen 
the two, becomes a qu' stion of construction. No'>, the 
first rule of construction, in sucli cases, is the known 
usage and praciice of Parliamentary bodies ; and, as 
tUoiie ot the Uriiisb PHrliamcnt were the best kuowa to 



11 

the framers of the Constitution, it cantiot be doubted 
that, in diten' initipf what an- the relative powers of the 
Vice Prfsident and the Senate, they ought to ppLvail. 
Under this view, as between the Vice President and 
Senate, the hotter possesses the s:ime power in deter- 
mining its ndes tliat is possessed by the H ousas of Par- 
liament, Without being restricted in the slightest degree 
by the fact, thai the \-ce President, under the Consti- 
tution, is President of the body, saving only the right 
of adopting such rules as api.l> to the appointment or 
election of a presiding officer, which the Senate would 
have possessed, if the Constitution had not provided a 
Pres (lent of tlie bodj ; and, as I have pr -^ed fron your 
own cases, that the parfc 'br power in quesion, mccn^ 
trovertibly belongs to the House, it follows, necessarily, 
according to established rules of eons ruction, that tbe 
Senate also pvissesses it. 

You have overlooked these obvious truths by affixing 
too high an id a to the powers of tlie presiding officer 
in preserving orde-. According to your conception, the 
Ho..s • is nothing and the nfficr every thing, on points 
of order. Nothing can be more erroneous. The power 
you attribute to him has never been possessed by the 
Presivlent, or Speaker, in any deliberative assembly ; no, 
not even bv delegation from h" body itself. 

The right of preserving order must depend on the 
power of enforcing it, or of punishing for a breach of 
ortler — a right inhere-nt in the House alone, and never, in 
any instance, delegated to ttie Chair. Our Constitution 
confines this right to each House of Congress, by pro- 
viding " that 111 y may punish for disorderly conduct;''' 
a power which tney neiiht^r have deUgaied nor ca>i da- 
legate to the presiding officer. What, then, is the right 
of preserving order, belonging to the Vice President, 
which you have so pompously announced, and for not 
enforcing which, according to your conception, you and 
your associates have denounced Mr. Calhoun almost as 
a traitor to his country .' 

It is simplv ih. rig, it of calling to order, in the atrictt 
literal meanincr, and so far from being derived from the 
right of preserving ord r as you ab-urd'y suppose, it 
is not even connected with it. The riglii of presei-ving- 
arder depend$ on the right of enforcing it, uv the ri^ht of 
punithmentfor breaches of order, always possessed by the 
body but never, either by delegation or otherwise, by 
the Chair. It is notorious that the Chair cannot enforce 
its calls to order. The body alone can, but that only on 
its decisions, and not on that of the presiding officer. 
It is thus maniteit, tiie high right of preserving order. 



to which you make the right of calling to order incideu- 
tal, belongs especially to the Senate, and not to the 
Vice FresiJ-nt ; and if your arguini*nt be correct the 
Incident must fullow the right, and, consequently, it is 
the rip^ht and duty of a Sena'or to call to order for dis- 
orderly conduct. So cle«r is the proposition, that, if the 
member called to order by the Chair, for disorderly 
conduct, chooses to per'-ist, the presding officer has no 
other rf-nriedy but to repeat hit call, or throw himtelf^ for 
the enforcement of it, onthe Senate. Thisfeebleness of the 
Chair, in queitions of order, txjjlains why there has al- 
ways been sue!' indisposition to call to ordr, even when 
it is ma''e the express duty, by rule, as in the House of 
Beprcbentatives, and t e House of Common* in Eng. 
land. 1 housands of instanct s night be cited to eatab- 
lish the truth of this remark, both there and here — in- 
stances in which all tliat h-is been said and uttered by 
Mr. Randolph is nothing, but in which the Speaker 
waited for the interference of soire of the members, io 
order to preserve order. Such was the case in the re- 
cent occuirence in th-* House of Commons, when Mr. 
Hume made an attack on th • Bish"p of London and the 
Lord C'hancell r, both of which, as members of the 
House of Lords, were und; r the protection of positive 
rules; yet, no one, even there, had the assurance to 
throw the respo'isibility on the presiding officer. The 
partizans of power in our country have the honor of 
Itading in these new and dangerous attacks on the free- 
dom ol debate. 

Some men of honest intention have fallen into the 
error about the right of the Vice President o pre« 
serve order, independently of the Senate, because the 
Judges or, as they express it, the presiding officer in 
the courts of justice, posess the rig',.t. A moment's 
reflection will shew t e fallacy. There is not the least 
analogy between the rights and duties of a Judge ijnd 
those of a presidin^i officer in a deliberative ass'-n.bly. 
The analogy is altog ther thi other way. It is b; twecH 
the Court and the House. In fact, the latter is o'ten 
called a court, and there is a very s'rict resemblance 
in tlie point und r consideration, between what 
may be called a parliamentary court und a court of jus- 
tice. Thty both have the right of CbU>ing their decisr>n 
to be respected, and order and decoi-un. to be observed 
in their presence, or by punishing those who offend. 
But who ever heard of the Speaker or V ce President 
punish ng for disord rly conduct.' T he utmost power 
they can exeroise over disorderly conduct, even in the 
lobby I gallery, is t.- cause it to be suppressed, for the 
timct by the Serjeant at Armsi 



Enough has been said, th' ugh the subject is far from 
being' exhsusted, tn demonstriite, that yeur views of the 
relai've powers and duties nf the Vice President and the 
Senate, in reaion to the point in qutsiioo, are wholly 
enont-ous. I' remains to be shown tha' your 'pinions 
(for arguments they cannot be called) are dangerous to 
our liberty, and that they are in cmHict with the first 
principles of our GoTeniment. 1 do not attribute to 
vou, or '.hose with whom you are associated, any deep- 
laid des Rn against public liberty. Sucli an a'tenint, as 
flagitious as it may be, requires a «a« <city and boldn'ss 
quite beyond what we have now to apprehend from 
those in power. But tha iheie exists, at the pr* sent 
time, a selfish and geedy ap()etiie to get and to hold 
office, and thai, to fftct th-'ir grovelling objects, doc- 
trines slaish and dangerous 're daily propagated, can- 
not be doubti d by even careless jb ervers. The h't-e- 
dom of d'.'bate is instinctively dreaded by the whole 
cons, high and low, of ihose who make « speculation of 
poll! cs, and well hey may : for it is the gr. at and only 
effectual means of d' tecting and holding up to public 
scorn every machination agains' the liberty of the coun- 
try. It rai ks first, ven before the liberty of the P-r-sg, 
the trial by jury, the right- of conscience, and the writ 
of habeas corpus, in the estimation of th ise w >o are ca- 
pable of forming a correct estimate oF the value of free- 
dom, and the best means 'jf preserving it. Agimst this 
palla<'ium of liberty your blow • are ainaed ; and. to do 
y(.u justi^-.e, it must be ackn'> • ledge', if the energy be 
not tiTea»,the direction is not des itule of skill. If vou 
could succeed in est'.b ishing tiie po nts whicUyuu iab >r, 
that ine Vicr- Prsident holds a pow^r over f.e freedom 
ot dTba'e, under ih right of preserving order, beyond 
tiie w II or control of ^he Senate ; and that, OH>equen ly, 
be al )ne is responsible for what might be considered 
an un iue exercise 'ftiie freedom of speech in debate, a 
snl'd f u idation would iie Uid, from which, in time, 
this grea" barrier against despo'ic power would be bat- 
teretl down. It is eagv to see that the scheme takes 
the po*ei if protectmgtbs, tiie first ofitsrighs, whol- 
ly t of ih hafids of ia<; Se :a!e, and places its custody 
in tne hands of a single indivi lual.and he in no d-.-grec rc- 
spoi'si'il". to the b^i.ly over whch 'hi- hgh power is t> be 
exerciS'-d; thus efl'^;c^ually desroying the key stone of 
freedom, responsibility, andintro !u:ing into a vi al part 
of our system, uncontrolled, or, what is the same thing, 
despi»t c power; which, biing deri»ed, by your thejry, 
from the Constitution, and being. *pplicable to all poi'its 
of order, neccssanjy would vest in the Vice President 
2 



14 

alone, an indenendent and absolute power, that would 
draw into t'le vcr'vex of iiis autliority an ui rimite 1 con- 
trol over 'he free ^m • f deba'.e. 

Varkthe coos quences ! If t'le Vice Pres'd-ni should 
bf l-insf to the sam>. party or ni'er'.st w hich brougtu the 
Prisideiit into piwer, or if he be depef^dent en hii for 
liis p :li'ic'i! s andi g or adv'anccme- t, you vrill virtually 
place the control over the freedom of debate in the hands of 
the Kxectitive. ^ 

YoM tl us inirod'jce /Ae President, a« it were, into I he 
Chnmber of the Senate, and place him virtually over the de- 
liberation of the body, ivith powers to restrain discussion, 
and shield his conduct from i>ivesti^ation Ltt us. for 
initarce, tupyos , that ti e prebei t Chief Magistrate 
sboiil>i be re-elected, aud 'hai the p^rty which s.jpi-orts 
him should succeed, as in all probability f ey Wi uld in 
thit c vc;it, in eltciin^ also their Vice President, cuu it 
be doubted that the ru es for the restraint of the free- 
dom 'if debate in the Senate, which hae been insisted 
on openly by the pnrty during the last winer, wou! 1 be 
re uc-d t'> p ac ice, throue^h a subservi-n' Vic- Presi- 
den ? And wh'dt arc th"Se rules ? One of the lea^lrg 
ones, to al'-eit to n-i olh<"r, is, thiitthr conduct of the 
Kx cutiv . as a co-ordinal'.- branch of iiiat G "ernmi.nt, 
cann the called in ques ion, by a Sei ator in d-^at- , at 
leas , so f m V rel tes ti imneach^'le (;ff?n es ; and of 
course an attempt to discuss 'he conduct of the President 
in such cases, would be disorderly, and render the Senator 
liable to be punished, e^.eii to expulsion. Wt-.-.il wou'.f be 
till ■ irise'.jueiice ? I he Senate would spttdily si^.k in- 
to a bi'riy to register the decrees of the I'nsidt-iv, and 
si. g Hosanna? in his urane, and be as degraded as the 
Itomai S- na-PjU'der Nero. 

U'l" le us SMppose the orp">ite state of things, in 
which th' Vic - Pres den' chouses to pursu. a c urse 
iniJe; eiiutnt of the will o- >hc Ex-cu(iv. , an', in- 
fctead of issuming so da Reruns »n cx':rci3 ot pow- 
er he ^h'uKi indiil>;e, (for i -dulj^ence it must be 
calvd, if tl:o\ve ■ by hi* c^un r> ) iha" Ir. ed"ni of de- 
bat , «hc;. exists in < th r deibt-rative usteinblies. 
\V. a will ifi-n fojow ? P.-ec.selv 'hut which has rccur- 
leU the litit *iut^r. Most • xagg rate<' and false acci u its 
would c--er wher bi pri'pap t d by hirelings o( pw- 
er, of tliT >lii.'hest occurrence in 'he -jenaie. T'le pub- 
lic ind giia 101 wmlJ he roust-d at the supposed disor- 
der ai".d !nd-o«>runr., and the *ho'e w )ul 1 •>'• artfully di- 
rt cted a^jaiiiH. tn • Vice Ppcside"t n order to prostrate 
llis n pilM lO". ; an ' hn- hi offi rr, v itho '* pa'.rOisjiffc 

or power, or even the rijht of defending himsef, would 



15 

be the larpet aga'nst which tlie whole fjrcc antl palroiv 
8gL ot t' 11 (imernm^nt would l>e directed. F-;* men 
woiM have the firmness tn encointcr tlsng'er si 're- 
mendous; snd the pracical result, in the Ion,T nn., must 
be a subservient yielding to the Executive will 

ON 5 LOW. 



No. n. 



V-- ^. /^^l 



Havinp; now establisheil, I may venture to 
sav beyond the possibility of reasonable contro- 
versy, that the idea of an inherent rigiit in tlie 
Vicf President, independent of, and beyond, the 
will of the Senate, to control the freedom of de- 
bate, is neither sanctioned by the Constitution, 
nor justified by the relation between tlie body 
and its presidios; officer, and that it is subversive 
of the right of free discussion, and consequently 
dan{2;erous to liberty, I nn^ht here fairly rest tlie 
qucstiun. To you, at li*ast, who treat with scorn 
the rules and usage of the Senate as the source of 
the power of the Vice President, all further inquiry 
is fairly closed. But, as manj, who may agree 
with you in the conclusion, may treat with con- 
tempt your high strained conception of the origin 
of the power under investigation, it will not be 
improper to ascertain whether it has been confer- 
red on the "V^ice President by any act of the Se- 
nate, express or implied, the only source whence 
the power can be fairly derived. In this view 
of the subject, the simple inquiry is, Has tlie Se- 
nate conferred the power .■' [t has been fully es- 
tablished, that they alone possess it, and, conse- 
quenil\', from the Senate only can it be de- 
rived. VN'e then affirm, that the Senate has not 
conferreil the po\\er. The assertion of tlic ne- 
gative in suth cases, is sufficient to throw the 
bi;rthen of proof on tho^e who hold the afiirma- 
tive. I call on you, then, or any of your asso- 
ciates, to point out the rulo, or the usaje of the 
Senate, by which the power has been cotiferrcd. 
None such has, or can be designated. If a simi- 



16 

]ar question be asked as to the power of the 
Speak r of the H' use of Representatives, how 
easy wouhl be the reply. The 19th rule, which 
expressly gives the power to him, would be iin- 
mfdiafely quoted ; and if that were supposed to 
be doubtful, the jiiurnals of the Htiuse would be 
held up as containing innumerable instances of 
the actual excercise of the power. No such an- 
swer can be given, wlun we turn to the power of 
the Vice President. The rules are niute, and 
thejournals "f the Senate silent What means 
this strikii'g difterence, but that, on this p(»int, 
there is a difference in fact betve' n the power 
of the Speaker, and of the Vice President ? — A 
difference which has been always understood and 
acted on ; and when to this we add, tliatthe rules 
of 'e two Houses in regard to the power are 
strikingly different ; that, while those of the Re- 
presentatives expressly delegate the power to the 
Speaker, those of the Senate, by strong implica- 
tion, withhold it from ihe Vice President, little 
room can be left for doubt. Compare, in this 
view, the 19th rule of the House, and the 7ih of 
the Senate. The former says, *' If any member, 
by spe;iking, or otherwise, transgress the rules of 
the House, the Speaker shall, or any member 
may, call to order ; in which case the member 
so called to order, shall immediately sit down, 
unless permitted to explain ; and the House 
shall, if appealed to, decide on the case without 
debate ; if there be no appeal, the decision of the 
Chair shall be submitted to. If the decision be 
in favor ef the member called to order, he shall 
beat liberty to proceed; if otherwise, he will 
not be permitted to proceed without leave of the 
House ; and if the case require it, he shall be 
lia'jle to the censure of the House." The rule 
of the Senate, on the contrary, provides, " H the 
member shall be called to order for words spoken, 
theexceptiunable words shall immediately be tak- 
en down in writing, that the President may be bet- 



n 

tcr enableil to judge of the matter." These are 
the corresijoniliiig rules of the two Houses, and 
can any impartial mind contend, that similar 
powers arc intended to be conferred by them on 
the Speaker and Vice President ? Or will it be 
insisted on that tlie difference in the phraseology 
is accidental, when it is known that they have 
often been revised on the reports of committees, 
who would not fail to compare th^ rules of the 
two Houses on correspondinj; subjects ? Under 
such circumstances, it is impossible that it could 
be intended to confer the same power by such dif- 
ference of phraseolofjy ; or that the withholding 
of the power in question from the Vice President 
was unintentional. This rational construction 
is greatly strengthened, when we advert to the 
different relations which the two oilicers bear to 
their respective Houses. The Speaker is chosen 
by the House of Representatives, and is conse- 
quently directly responsible to the body, and his 
decision, by the rules, may be appealed from to 
th House. The Vice President, on the contrary, 
is placed in the chair by the Constitution, is not 
responsible to the Senate, and his decision is 
without appeal. Need we look further for the 
reason of so essential a variation in the rules con- 
ferring power on their respective presiding o.Ti- 
cers r It is a remarkable fact, that the same 
difference exists in the relation between the pre- 
siding oflicers of the two House? of the British 
Parliament, and the bodies over which they re- 
spectively preside. In the Commons, the Speak- 
er is chosen as in our House of Representatives, 
and is, consequently, in like manner responsible; 
on the contrary, in the House of Lords, the Chan- 
cellor presides ex otficio, in like manner as the 
Vice President in the senate, and is, in like 
manner, irresponsible to the body. Now it is no 
less remarkable, that the Speaker possesses the 
power in (jufstion, wliile it is perfectly certain, 
that the Lord Chancellor docs not. Like cause, 
2» 



18 

hke eff*-' t ; dissimilar cause, dissimilar cftect. 
Vou, sir, have, it is true, made a puny effort to 
draw a distinction between the mode in which 
the Vice President and the Lord Chancellor are 
app tinted ; and have also feebly denied that the 
latter has not the power of callin* to order Both 
of these efforts show the desperation of your 
causi*. What does it signify by whom an ex officio 
officer is appointed, if not by the body ? There 
can be but one material point, and that without 
reference to the mode of appointment ; is he, or 
is he not, responsible to the House ? If the for- 
mer, there is good cause for the delegation of the 
power ; for power exercised b\ responsible agents 
is substantially exercised by the principal ; while 
by irresponsible agents it is the power of him by 
whom it is exercised. Nor is your effort to show 
that the Chancellor has the power, less unhappy. 
You have cited but one instance, and that really 
renders you ridiculous. The Lord Chancellor, 
as is well known, has the right of speaking; and 
you most absurdly cite the commencement of a 
speech of one of the chancellors, in which he 
states, that he would call back the attention of 
the Lords to the question at issue, as an instance 
of ex. rcising the power of calling to order, as 
presiding officer, for departure from the ques- 
tion I Thougli you ha^e signally failed to prove 
your position, you have not less completely esta- 
blished the fact, that your integrity is not above 
a resort to trick, where argument fails. Nor is 
this the only instance of subterfuge. You made 
a sin>ilar effort lo do away th^- authority of the 
venerable Jeffers.'n. He has left on record that 
he considered his pnw.T as presiding officer of the 
Senate, as the power of tnnpiraiie, or what is the 
same thing, an appellate power. In order to break 
the force of this authority, you have denied the 
plain and iiivari..ble meanitig of the wonl, aiid at- 
tempted to affix one to it, which it nev.r bears. 
You say, that its Uaual uieauiug is syuonyuiuus 



19 

with " office," •• authorii>," or 'Hhe act of deter- 
mining," an.! '.hat it is only in its technical sense, 
th;tt n convys tK«. idea ot an appeliut- powt-r ! 
Can it be u.ikno-.vn to y«.u, tliat no word in the 
lan<»ua;ie more invariably has at'ached to it the 
idea ot'decision by appeal, an?! tha» tho»e is not an 
instance of its beli.*; used h) a..} respectable au- 
thtirity in tlie sense which you state to be its 
Bsual moaning ? 

It only remains to consider the cases that 
you have cited from the M. nual, t(i prove that 
the Speaker of the House of Commons possess- 
es the power in question ; by whic'i yu would 
infer that it belongs also to the Vice President. 
A very strange deduction by one who believes 
that the power originates in the Constitution, 
and that it neither ciin be given or taken away 
by the authority of the Senate itself. After 
asserting that it has " deeper and holier founda- 
ticns than the rules and usages of the Senate," 
there is soniethirg more than ridiculous, that you 
at last seek for the power in thi- rules and usages 
of MiP Mouse of Commons ! But let such incon- 
si*? ency pass. You h,ive indeed established the 
fact, that th • Speaker has the power, but you 
ha^e overlooked the material circunistance, as I 
have shown fr'-m your oun cases, that he possess- 
e? it by positive rules of th" House. You might 
as well have shown, that the Sj^'aker of the 
IL.use of Reprcsen'atives possesses it, and then 
in< rred that th*- Vice President does also: for 
h' . too, holds the power by positive rules of the 
bt'ly, which makes the analogy as strong in the 
one case as the other. 

Butyou wouhl have it understood, that the rules 
of Pat litment have been adopted by the Senate. 
Ml- such thing. I challenge you to cite a cin- 
gle rule or act of the Senate that gives coun'eo- 
ancv to it. Finally, you tell us, tliat Mr J Her- 
so^ has cited thcs rules as being part (»f tin rules 
and usages of the Senate. AdmiUir g for a mo- 



20 

uient that Mr. JefTerson had cited them as such, 
still, a \ery important question vs'oiild arise, how 
came they to be tlie rulf-s of the Senate ? The 
Constitution provides, that the Senate shall de- 
termine the rules of its proccdinjis; now, if that 
b.ulv has not by any rule adopted the rules of the 
British Pirliament, by what process of rcasoa 
could they be construed to be the rules of the 
Senitte ? That the Senate his not adopted the 
rules of Parliament is certain ; and [ confess I 
am not a liitle curious to see the pr'cpss of rea- 
soning bv which Ihcy are made the rules of the 
Senate, wiihoui udop'tiin. Is there not a striking 
analoi^y between this and the question, whether 
the common law is a part of the laws of the 
Union? We know that they have been decided 
by the highest judicial authority not to be ; and, 
it seems to nie, the arjj;uments, which would be 
applicable to the one, would be equally so to the 
other question. That the rules and usages of 
Parliament may be referred to, to illustrate the 
rules ofeitlier liouse of Congress, is quite a dis- 
tinct proposiuo I, and may be readily admitted. 
Aiguments ma^^ be drawn from any source calcu- 
lated to illustrate, but that is wholly ditlerent 
from giving to the rules of another body a bind- 
ing force on the Senate, without ever having been 
recognized as its rules, This is a subject of 
deep and grave importance; but, as it is not ne- 
cessary to my purpose, I decline entering on it. 
It is sullkient, at present, to deny that Mr. Jef- 
ferson has cited the rules of the Parliament re- 
ferred to by you as tliose of the Senate. Oii the 
contrary, they are expressly cited as the rules of 
the British House of Commons, withcmt stating 
them to be obligatory on tlie Senate. He has 
notoriously cited many of the rules of that body, 
whieh are wh )lly dissimilar from the usages of 
the Senate. But you cite Mr. JeilV'Son's opin- 
ion, in vvhich he savs, " The v">enate have accord- 
ingly formed some rules for its government," 



SI 

(they have been much enlarged since) " but these 
goifiji; only to a few cases, they have referred to 
the dt'cisiun of the Presiili-nt without debate or 
appeal all questions of order arising under their 
own rules, or where there is none. ThiH places 
under the discretion of th Presi<lent a very ex- 
tensive field of decision." If your object in 
quoting the above passage was to show that, 
where the Senate has adopted n(» rule of its own, 
the rules of Parliament are those of the Senate, 
it completely fails. Not the slightest counte- 
nance is given to such an >dea. Mr. Jt^fferson, na 
the contrary, says, that in cases of omission, the 
sound discretion of the President is the rule;* and 
such has been the practice; and from which it has 
followed, that usages of the Senate are very dif- 
ferent from the Parli iment, whicli could not be, 
if the latter were aflopted, where there were no 
po<iitive rules by the Senate. 

If this view of the subject be correct, which is 
certainly Mr. J. fferson's, the Vice President had 
the right to make the rule by exercising a sound 
discretion ; and the only question that could arise 
in this view is, whether he has acted on correct 
principles in referring the power to the House, 
instead of exercising it by the Chair. So long as 
doubtful and irresponsible power ought not to be 
assumed ; so long as the freedom of debate is es- 
sential to liberty ; and so long as it is an axiom 
in politics that no power can b- safe but what is 
in the final control and custody of the body over 
which it is exercised, so long the rule (to view it 
in that light) adopted by the Vice President, 



* This opinion of Mr. Jefferson's is probably founded 
on the la'ter part ot the 6th rule, which stri)nply sup- 
ports it. The rule is as follows: 'When a member 
shall be called to order, he shal' sit down until tlie Pre- 
sidentshall have dit rmined whether he is in order or 
not, and every question of ordrr s'lall be decided by 
\he President, without debate; but if there be a doubt in 
his mind, he may call for the sense of the Senate." 



22 

will be considered in conformity to sound, gener- 
al, pitlitiral principles. liut. suppose it t<» be 
cone -ived that the rules of Parliament are those 
of the Senate, when not ovcrrulpd by its own posi- 
tive acts, st'l! two ijuestions would remain : first, 
whether the Tlh rule of the Senate, hv a stiund 
constructiim, da.'s not restrain the Vice Prt-si- 
dent from exercisin'^ the power, by limiting it to 
the members i>f the Senate? And, secondly, whe- 
ther the practice of the House of Lords, or that 
of the Commons, ouj^ht, in this particular, to pre- 
vail ? Bith of those points have already been in- 
cidentally considered, and a single remark will 
now suffice. Whether we regard the nature of 
the power, or the principles of our system of go- 
vernment, there can be no doubt ihat the decision 
ought to be against the practice of the H use of 
Commons, and in favor of that of the House of 
Lords. 

It may not be improper to notice an opinion, 
which, if I mistake not, has, in no small degree, 
contributed to the error r.hich exists as to the 
decision of the Vice President. There are many 
who are far from ag;reeing with your absurd 
and dangt'T'ius positions, as to the i'lherent pow- 
ers of the Vice President over the freedom of de- 
bat<', but who have, I thi'ik, a vague conception 
that he has the right in dispute, as presiding offi- 
cer, but a right subordinate to, and dependent on, 
the Senate. They concede to the Senate the 
right of determining their rules, and that this 
riglit comprehends that of determining what is or 
what is not disorderly conduct, and how the same 
shall be noticed, or inhibited; but thcv have an 
idea that the ex oflicio duty of the Vice President 
to regulate the proceedings of the Senate accord- 
ing to their own rules, extends to cases of the 
freedom of debate. The amount of the argumeut, 
as far as I can understand it, is, that, where there 
is a rule of the Senate, the Vice President has, 
ox ollicio, the power of regulating the proceed- 



13 



ings of the Senate by it, without any express au- 
thority in the nile to that t-ft* ci. All this may- 
be fairly coiut^ded, but it <le( i(l»'S n()ilMi);i It 
bring? back the qii: stion to ihf iiicjuiry, Is there, 
or is there not, suc!t a rult ? which has been lully 
considered, .iiul, [trust, satisfactordy det»-rniined 
in the negative. I will not again rt^pr.it the- argu- 
ments otj this point. I do not deem it necessary. 
It is S'iflici. nt to rtmark, if there bt- a rule, Ui it 
be shown, and the question is at an end, '1 here 
is no! e. 

As connected with this part of the subject, I 
do not thiok It necessary to meet tin- ridiculous 
chai'ge of Miconsistenc) which you make agjiinst 
the Vice President in the exercise of his power, 
and which you endeavor to support by reference 
to the slale'and false accounts of his conduct in 
thecase of iMr. Dickersoh. It is sufficient that 
Mr. D. has re; elled the charge of injustice, and 
you exiiibit but a sorry and factious appearance 
in defetuling a Senator from ojipression, who is 
not conscious of any injustice having been in- 
flicted. 

Having demonstrated that the powers which 
you claim ft»r the Vice Presidett dn not bptntiof 
to him ns presiding, officer ol \he Senate, and 
that they are not ' .M.f.-rred on him by the rules 
or us ge of the enate, or those ot Parllao ent, 
I mav safely at)'i., ihat it does m^t exist, and 
that, so lar fr^ m ceiibure, Mr. C.ilhoun deserves 
praise for decliniiig to exercis'- it. He has acted 
in the spirit that ougiit to act', ate evt-rv virtuous 
publu lunctuiii iry: not to as^sume doubilul puw- 
er-" — a spirit, under our systems of delegated au- 
th-ritv, essential to the preservation of liberty, 
and for being guided by which, he '.vill receive 
the thafiks of the country when the excitement of 
the (\ny lias ;>»asefl awa>. 

1 have nnw foni| leted what may be considered 

the invistigi'.tuMi d the sutject ; l>ut there are 

Still several of your remarks that require notice 



24 

You liave not only attacked the decision of Mr. 
Calhiinti, but you have impugned his motives 
With licentious severity. The corrupt are the 
most disposed to attribute corruption, and your 
unprovoked and unjustifiable attack on Mr. C's 
motives sptfdk as little in favor of your heart as 
your arirumi-n^s do of your head. Fortunately 
for the Vice President, his general character for 
virtue and patriotiMn shield him from the impu- 
tation ot such gross abuse of power, from such 
im()uri' motives, as you attribute to him. He 
could not decide differently from what he did, 
without being at war with the principles which 
have ever governed him. It is well knowti to all 
acquainted with him, publicly or privately, that 
the maxim which he holds in the highest venera- 
tion, and which he regards as the foundation of 
our whole system of government, is, that power 
should be controlled by the body over which it 
is exercised, and that, without such responsibi ity, 
all delegated power would speedily become cor- 
rupt. Whether he is wrong in giving too high an 
estimate to this favorite maxim, is immaterial. 
It is, and long has been, his ; and could not f-iil 
in having great influence in the decision, \ hich 
you have so seriously assaulted. Had his princi- 
ples been like yours, as illustrated inyourKssay, 
it is possible he might have taken a different 
view of the subject ; but, as he has decided in 
conformity to principles long fixed in his mind, 
there is something malignant in the extreme, to 
attribute his decision to motives of personal en- 
mi'y. You not only attack Mr. C's motives for 
this decision, but also his motive for the consti- 
tution of the Committee of Foreign Relations. — 
You think it a crime in him, that the venerable 
and patriotic Macon should be placed at (he head 
of theCommillee. I will neither defnti him nor 
the other members of the Connmttee. They need 
no defence ; but 1 cannot but leoiark, that the 
election of Mr. Macou President pro tern, of the 



25 

Senate, is a singular comment on your malig- 
nant attack on the Vice President. 

It would have been iinpossiblt; that you should 
steer clear ofthe cant of your party, and we accord- 
in;>;ly have a prolusion ol' vaj^ue cliar<;es about Mr. 
Calhoun's ambition, 'l he lowest and most mer- 
cenary hireling:; can easily coin such charj^es; and 
while they deal in tlie general, without a single 
specification, it is utterly impossible to meet or 
refute them; but, fortunately, they go for notiiins; 
with the wise and virtuous, saving only that, oa 
the part of those who make them, they evince an 
envious, morbid mind, which, having no real 
ground of attack, indulges in vague unmeaning 
abuse. It is highly honorable to Mr. C. that, in 
the midst of so much political, enmity, his per- 
sonal and public character stands free from all 
but one specific charge ; which is, that he has in- 
clined, in his present station, /oo tn'ich against Ins 
tli'u pC'i'fV, and tQO much in favor of th^ iuf «/i'- 
mf-ble right of the freedom oj debute. That he 
has been iwdefatigable in the discharge of his du- 
ty ; that he has been courteous to the members, 
and prompt and intelligent, all acknowledge. 
]Sot a moment was he absent from his post dur- 
ing a long and laborious session, and often remain- 
ed in the chair, without leaving it, from 8 to i.2 
hours. He has, however, committed one unpar- 
'. .blesin, which blots out all. He did not 
Mop Mr Randolph. This is the head and front 
of his offending. And who is Mr. Randolph? 
Is he, or his manners, a stranger in our national 
councils ? For more than a quarter of a centu- 
ry he has been a member of Congress, and, dur- 
ing the whole time, his character has remained 
unchanged. Highly talented, eloquent, severe, 
and eccentric ; always wandering from the ques- 
tion, but often uttering wisdom worthy of a Ba- 
con, and wit that would notdiscredit a Sheridan, 
every Spi^aker had freely indulged him in his 
peculiar manner, and that without responsibility 
3 



2(i 

or censure ; and none more freely than the pre- 
sent S cretary of State, while he presided in the 
House of Ileprest-ntativi's. He is elected, with 
a kiiowted^^e of all this, by the ancient and re- 
uown -d Commonwealth of Virj^inia, and takes his 
seat in the Senate. An immediate outcry is made 
against the Vice President for permitting him, who 
had been so long permitted, by so many Speakers, 
to exercise his usual freedom of discussion; 
thou;;li in no icspects were his attacks on the 
Administration freer than what they had been on 
ihose of Mr. JetVerson, Mr. Madison, and Mr. 
Monroe. Who can doubt, if Mr. Cjlhoun had 
yiehled to this clamor, that the whole current 
would have turned, and that he would then have 
been more severely denounced for what would 
have been called his tyranny and usurpation, 
than he has been for refusing; to interfere wiili 
ihe freedom of debate r His authority would 
have been denied, and prcpe.-ly ilcnied ; the fact, 
that Mr.R.had been permitted by all other presid- 
ing officers, for so long a time, to speak without 
restraint, woy.ld have been dwelt on ; and the 
injustice done to the Senator, and the insult of- 
fered to the State that sent him, would have beea 
painted in the most lively colors. These consi- 
derations, wc are satisfied, had no weight with 
the Vice President. Those who know him, know 
that no man is more regardless of consequenccs.ia 
the discharge of his duty ; but that the attack on 
l)im is personal, in order to sliake his political 
standing, and prostrate his character, is clearly 
evinced bv every circumstance : and, with this 
object, that he would have been assaulted, act as he 
might, is most certain. It is for rhe American 
People to determine, whether this conspiracy 
against a public servant, whose only fault is, that 
he has chosen the side of liberty, rather than of 
power, and whose highest crime consists in a re- 
verential regard for the freedom of debate, shali 
succeed. ONSLOW. 



37 



The fu'lowiriff obsei-vutions cniuprise the Dcdsion of tJie 
Vice President on the subject which ffuvc rise to the fire- 
ceding Ussiiiis, delivered at the conclusion of the Debate. 

The VICK PRESIDENT rose, and said he trusted that 
the Seiiat- would indulge him in making a few observa- 
tions b» fore he resumed his seat, as th< debate on the 
subject juAt decided liad rel..tion necessarily to the du- 
tie>* of t'li Chair. 

No one, mor than myself, said the Vice Prksi dent, 
can be more deeply impn ssed • itii the great tint , that 
the preservation of rigiUs d'pends, mainly, on their ex- 
ercise. That luition deservt d to conquer tiie world, wliich 
called its army exercitus; and so will thf n;it on disserve 
th. t t li'ieity shall be immortal, which lays tht- founda- 
tion of its system of Government on th- great principles, 
tl.atno power ought to be del gated which can be fairly- 
exercised by tile con-^tituent body, «nd that none ought 
ever to be df legated but to responsible agents Tliese 
have been my maxims through the whole of my political 
life, and 1 should be inconsistent with mys> If if I did not 
give my entire assent t th« principles on which the 
rales in question have been rescinded. I trust, said he, 
that it never will be the ambition of him, whose lot it is 
now to occupy this Chair, to enlarge its powers. My 
tin.'b'ti'in, I hope, pursues a different direction- not to 
enlarge powers but to discharge, W'th industry, fidt-lity, 
und firmness, tiie d' ties which may be imposed on me. 
Thus feeling, I shall witness, with pleasure, the resump- 
tion o all the powers which can t>e propi-rly exercised 
by the Senate, hb they will be then placed, where alone 
rhey can be with perfi cts f ty. 

From tlie dir< ction which the dcb:.te in some d-^gree, 
look, as well as from what has been said without these 
walls, it becomes, on this occasion, proper that I should 
St .tr, for the information of this body, tht- construction 
that the c:'air has put on t'le 6th and 7th rules of the Se- 
nate. Thoy are in the following words : 

'• When a member shall be called to order, he shall 
"sit down, until the l'residt;nt shall have determined 
" whether he is in order or not ; and every question of 
" order shall be decided by the l'r<sid<.nt svithout de- 
'• 1) tc; but if til. re be a doubt in his mind, he may call 
" for the sense of the Senate. 

" l! the men.ber be called to order for words spoken, 
" the exceptionable words shall immediately be taken 
•• down, in writi g, t:.at the I'resident may be better 
" enabled t j judge of the matter." 



28 

The rhair, said the Vice PnESiDtNT, has bestowed its 
most d.-liherat'- and anxious att'-nti n, by nig! t and by 
dav, on the qiit-^ti -n of the extent of its powt-rs, under a 
correct const uct' n o* these rules and has s ttl d in 
the conviction, thut the ripht to call to order, on questions 
touching thr latitude or freedom of debat', belonj^s ex- 
clusively to thf members of this body, and imt to tJie 
Chair. The power of the Fresidinp officer, on these 
gre t points, is an appelate power oniy ; and, conse- 
quentl\,t*ie duti s of the Chair commence when a Sen- 
at >r is called to nr<ler by a Senator. Whenever such a 
call shall be made, the > hair will not be found unpre- 
pared to discliarg'- its only function s in such a case — 
that of decidin}^ on the point of order subniitt d. U hat 
the opinion of t'u- prebidinp officer is in relation to the 
fr etiom of debate, int'iis bod\, it will bt- time tod-clare, 
when a qu stion may be presented ; bu', such as it i?» 
it wdl b ■ firmly, and, 1 tni^t I may a d. fearlessly ...ain- 
tained. But, 1 rej 'ice th.t the rules of the Sen.^te, on 
a [) .ii t so impoitiii:t, gave to the Chair no original pow- 
er,Hnd tiiat .t can exercise no control tdl called on by the 
Senate its^ If. It w as right in itself, h<: said, in strict i on- 
formity to the principles which had guided the Senate 
in t.> "vote y st taken — tict so high a pp.wer shouhl be 
plac-d oi ly in the ru>tody of the b d^; .; The Vict 1'RK-^ 
siDKST said he prided himself on hs connection with tue 
Senate ; but t was impossible that he should forge ttlut 
th t connect on was created b_\ the operation of the • on- 
St tution. In discharging his duty in this seat, t would be 
unpardonable in him not to recollect, tliat He was placed 
in the Chair, not by the voice of the Senate, but by that 
of tlie People ; and that to them, and not tuis body, he 
was u!ti iiutely responsible- Standing in the r< lation he 
di 1 to the Sen.te, he had laid it down as un invariable 
rule, to assume no power m tlu- least degree doubtful; 
and to coiifine liimself to a just but firm exercise of the 
P' wers clea Iv delegatedjli con. lusion he tendcrr^d to 
tl e Senate his sincere acknowledgments that in re- 
scinding the rule, suc'.i d- ileal regard had been paid to 
his feeli igs in the debate. An. pie ju-,tice h.td been 
done to th. indu-try and fidelits with which he had ho- 
nestly attempted t') disciiarge his aniuous duties. — 
Deeming himself calleil on by the debate tiiat had taken 
place, to say t us much in explanation, he beg^^d the 
intlulgcme of the Senate for having dune bo; and re* 
umed his seat. 

NoTB. — The numbers of " PATniCR He:«ht" will be 
found in the National Journal uf the Ist of Aiay, und the 
7th of June, ISJo. 



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